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Sovereign debt renegotiation in the first half of the 1980s 
has been carried on in a creditor dominated model in which
full repayment and treating repayment as an overriding 
economic goal are taken as given and only secondary issues are 
in fact treated as negotiable. It is tied to the IMF high 
conditionality model. While the threat of an international 
financial system collapse has been averted, at least to date, 
the renegotiations have not laid a stable basis for a return
to regular output and trade growth for debtors, or even
globally. It is argued that the present model leads to 
negative sum games and that specific changes in it could yield 
net gains to debtors, the world economy, creditor economies
and - probably - creditor commercial banks. The increasing 
resistance to, and attempts toward unilateral initiatives by 
certain debtors make negotiation of at least some of these 
changes both potentially possible and urgent.
THIRD WORLD SOVEREIGN DEBT RENEGOTIATION 1980-86 AND AFTER: 
PROCEDURES, PARADIGMS AND PORTENTS
Reginald Herbold Greenl/
The crisis in Africa in recent years is 
overwhelmingly the product of external shocks... 
Without the heavy post-1978 external blows or, given 
those blows, with adequate international buffers 
against them, the majority of African economies would 
not be sliding backward as they are now doing....
- G. K. Helleiner, 1984
Insufficient finance leads to unwarranted exchange 
rate depreciation, restriction or debt default.
- Onno Ruding
Interim Committee Chairman, 1985
The preservation of the international financial 
system in its existing form and the mode adopted for 
debt crises management have had high costs not only 
for debtor countries but also for non-financial 
actors in the developed world.... financial 
interests, institutions and criteria have been 
extremely dominant in the way that debt crises have 
been managed.
- S. Griffith-Jones2/, 1986
A resumption of net new lending by the commercial 
banks is in the common interests of the banks and 
their country clients... will facilitate the 
adjustment efforts... while... increasing the quality 
of the banks’ own assets.
- J. Delarosiere, Managing 
Director IMF, 1986
Case by Case: But the Cases Have Altered
The period since 1980 has seen more renegotiation and 
rescheduling of sovereign external debt than the entire amount 
ever previously renegotiated. The pattern used was that 
developed over the 1960s and 1970s for dealing with sovereign 
debtor debt service crises on a case by case basis which -
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with rare exceptions - increased rather than decreased the 
present discounted value of future interest and principal 
payments and allowed relief on current payment levels for 
quite brief periods (usually 18 to 36 months).
This retreaded 1960s-70s model is very different from the 
process which pertained during previous generalised external 
debt crises, e.g. that of the 1930s (Eichengreen and Portes
1985). Then the debtor governments defaulted. Over 1980-86, 
virtually without exception, creditor banks have avoided 
formally declaring a default (although they would often have 
been well within their legal rights had they done so). 
Debtors - even when in fact in severe arrears in interest on 
and repayment of sovereign debt - have been loath to declare 
formal selective or general moratoria, let alone defaults or 
repudiations. In these previous crises whatever renegotiation 
took place was after long default and - allowing for inflation 
and delay - creditors usually sustained heavy losses. The 
defaults and losses did not directly threaten the
international financial system because the holders were 
predominantly not banks or other key financial institutions.
The Paris Club (government to government) and London Club
(bank to government) renegotiating patterns were built up in 
the 1960s and 1970s. A substantial number of cases were
handled, overwhelmingly of small, weak African economies with 
external debt levels which, while crippling in terms of 
service cost to the debtor, were an almost trivial proportion 
of the outstanding credits of banks and governments concerned 
on the creditor side. Further, these governments were 
exceptions - most debtors accounting for most sovereign 
external debt, even in Africa, did not find servicing 
impossible. in addition, most developing countries were able 
to secure a positive net flow of financial resources (new
loans plus grants less loan repayments and interest payments).
As a result the creditor governments had very litle bargaining 
power. Default would wipe out their access to new loans (and 
grants) and cause trade credit to dry up, but would not 
seriously inconvenience the lenders. The fact of needing to 
reschedule was strong presumptive evidence either of external 
debt or other economic mismanagement and/or of a severe terms 
of trade or natural disaster shock. Further, in each case one 
small country with limited expert personnel sat across the 
table from a phalanx of big, well staffed goverments or banks.
Not surprisingly the results were that terms were relatively 
harsh: the period for which arrears, future repayments and -
especially - interest were deferrable was short; the period 
over which these rescheduled payments were to be made good was 
rarely over ten years; the interest rates on rescheduled items 
were at least as high as their previous average. If it was 
felt that bad luck had played a large part in the debt crisis 
then the governmental creditors might put up a parallel soft 
loan or grant package but not negotiate it as part of the
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rescheduling. The one major exception to this pattern - the 
Indonesian external debt reconstruction managed by Herman Abs, 
which radically cut the present value of that country's debt - 
remained an isolated instance.
F rom Exception To Rule
In the first half of the 1980s this model has been applied to 
a very different group of creditors in a very different 
context but with unchanged basic characteristics (IMF 1983; 
World Bank 1986a):
Vj
a. not only have there been more reschedulings, but these 
have involved major debtors with outstanding sovereign 
debt much larger (often singly, let alone collectively) 
than the net worth of lending banks and even in the case 
of governments representing a substantial proportion of 
credit outstanding;
b. the world economy was growing feebly - or not at all -
and world trade growth was very sluggish, thus raising
doubts whether need to reschedule was presumptive 
evidence of prior mismanagement;
c. the net transfer of financial resources for Latin 
American debtors (a fortiori from the commercial banks) 
had gone into reverse with interest plus repayments
exceeding new loans. In sub-Saharan Africa new loans
plus grants, but not loans alone, did provide a declining 
net transfer. Therefore, rescheduling created no
presumption of an early return to a net financial 
resource inLiuw.3/
However, because negotiations took place in the old format, 
the old conditions tended to remain. Short periods of
deferral, relatively brief periods of subsequent repayment, no 
concessions of much significance on rates, one debtor alone
negotiating against a phalanx of all major creditors remained 
the rule. There were some modifications:
a. the IMF was allocated a leading macro supervisory
(enforcement) role by insisting that a higher credit 
tranche agreement with associated exchange rate, credit 
control and budgetary stringency measures was a
precondition for P a n s  or London Club reschedulings
(except for non-IMF members such as Cuba and Poland). 
Some selective net transfers to favoured Asian economies 
survived but even there doubts were growing. Getting out 
of or at least reducing exposure in developing countries 
was the medium term goal of growing numbers of commercial 
banks;
b. 'involuntary lending' by banks became part of most London
Club reschedulings, i.e. new loans were provided for in
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the agreements at levels which reduced the net financial 
outflow by the debtor (i.e. covered most or all loan 
repayment by rolling over - de facto - into new loans and 
in most cases also covered a portion of interest due)4/ 
and - less systematically - similar provisions as to 
concessional loans and grants were built into Paris Club 
government debt rescheduling;
c. the sovereign debtors were convinced (coerced) into 
accepting liability for the external borrowings of 
enterprises (private as well as public sector) even if 
these had not previously been guaranteed by the 
governments on the basis that unless they did so their 
government and economy would be seen as uncreditworthy 
and no rescheduling agreed.^/
An Alternative Approach: The Enterprise Model
The model practised was not the only possible one. Indeed it 
contrasts very oddly with the one developed over the same 
period for restructuring commercial bank claims on large, 
troubled (illiquid or insolvent) enterprises at both national 
and international levels. That model is characterised by:
a. injection of net new money - often including net new bank 
money;
b. lowering of total interest charges on outstanding bank
credit;
c. lowering the capital value of bank claims - usually by
co nverting a portion of loans into preference o l ordinary 
shares whose value (unless the company recovers) is 
highly problematic;
d. designing the overall package on the basis that it must
be such as to allow a return to growth and profitability
by the enterprise within a brief period on fairly
cautious assumptions, and must both place real burdens
(sacrifices) on all parties and give each of them
(including in most cases existing shareholders) a real 
remaining value and a chance of future gains.
The contrast is striking, especially when one recalls that
banks can put in a liquidator and wind up or sell off an 
enterprise while no truly analagous procedure is practicable 
today6/ with respect to sovereign borrowers.7/ What is
surprising is how rarely this alternative model has been 
pointed to when evaluating the one used in respect to 
sovereign risk borrowers.8/
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With What Results To Date 11/
The 1980-86 results of the case by case, creditor financial 
concerns centred, limited concessions debt renegotiation model 
are mixed (World Bank 1986; Commonwealth Secretariat 1982; 
UNCTAD 1981-85; Ffrench-Davies and Molina 1985). First, it 
has averted a collapse either of the international financial 
system or of major financial institutions. That is no small 
gain - a new Credit Anstalt debacle with an even remotely 
parallel chain reaction through the interntional financial 
system would have cost debtors and creditors alike a great 
deal. Second, it has preserved (at least on the books) high 
levels of profitability on sovereign risk lending while 
allowing a very limited degree of absolute additional (and a 
decline of relative) commercial bank exposure to catastrophic 
loss on such lending to developing countries. Third, that 
stability remains precarious - periods of apparent self 
congratulation that all is under control are regularly 
followed by renewed pending crises and hectic juggling.
From the point of view of debtors taken separately the results 
are much worse. While default has been avoided and formal 
creditworthiness maintained, this has been at the price of 
severe domestic demand compression (recession or depression 
creation) to create a trade surplus adequate to cover net 
financial resource outflows. There has been no return to net 
inflows (on combined capital and interest accounts) - the 
formal creditworthiness has not carried with it much 
willingness to extend net new credit - and the prospects for 
such a return to positive financial transfers have steadily 
receded like a desert mirage with the result that 
reschedulings have become sequential (not once-for-all) 
evento.
Even for creditor country institutions and enterprises other 
than financial institutions the results have, on balance, been 
negative. First, the need to cut demand - especially demand 
for imports - by Third World debtors has radically reduced 
their resilience as export markets for OECD countries. By so 
doing, it has wiped out one of the buoyant factors which led 
to a rapid recovery after the 1973-75 economic shocks.
Second, by forcing the debtors to raise exports to meet debt
service obligations (e.g. for Brazil to achieve the world's 
third largest trade surplus to cover - or almost cover - 
interest payments alone) it has fanned the forces of
protectionism by creating very real problems of unemployment, 
capacity underutilisation and regional decline in the 
industrial economies. Arguably, the pressure to expand, or at 
least maintain, export earnings to service debt has
contributed both to overproduction and weak selling in primary 
commodity markets.
Third, by creating a climate of economic uncertainty, it has 
undermined the initiatives of entrepreneurs and the optimism
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of state and central bank policy makers. Thus it has 
encouraged low investment and very cautious9/ overall fiscal 
and monetary policies which have tended to extend the 
depression and limit both the rate and stability of subsequent 
recover ies.
In short, the worst - a financial apocalypse followed by a 
deep and lasting world depression - has, to date, been
averted. But no stable new basis for developing country
sovereign debt flows or management and no trade context
conducive either to stable recovery in the industrial (let
alone the debtor developing) economies or to a return to rapid
expansion of world trade has been achieved. Indeed, doubts as 
to whether the feared financial system crisis has been averted 
or merely postponed refuse to go away. On the most optimistic 
view they keep recurring, and on a more pessimistic
interpretation they oscillate around a rising trend. Thus by 
the third quarter of 1986, Mexico was feared likely to move 
toward a de facto moratorium and South Korea, which had
previously been seen as the safe Third World borrower par 
excellence. (despite high export and national growth and a 
record trade surplus) was argued by some semi-official and
financial sources to be a high risk case.
Some Variations Around A Theme
The model sketched above is not monolithic. There are 
regional and national variants and some divergencies among 
rescheduling agreements (IMF 1983; World Bank 1986).
The locus classicus of the model is Latin America and 
particularly the larger South American states pins Mexico. 
This is true for three reasons. First, the bulk of commercial 
bank sovereign risk credit to developing countries is extended 
to Latin America and constitutes the major part of Latin 
America's access to external financial flows because 
concessional finance is very limited on non-concessional 
governmental (export credit) and international financial 
institution (World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank) 
flows are substantial but much less than commercial bank ones. 
Second, except for a few smaller economies where aid and/or 
IBRD/IADB lending is a higher than average proportion of 
flows, Latin America has been characterised by net negative 
financial transfers, at least from 1982. Third, the real 
threats Latin American defaults could pose to the 
international financial system have concentrated attention on 
this region and made 'solutions' arrived at there the norm for 
use elsewhere.
China and India are special cases. Neither is heavily 
externally indebted. Neither is viewed as a serious credit 
risk and both enjoy net financial inflows.
Asia - excluding India and China - has not to date been
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prominent in debt rescheduling. Indeed the 1960s and 1970s 
model of rescheduling needed only for the exceptionally 
unlucky or ill managed economy - e.g. the Philippines whose 
experience is analagous to a second tier Latin American
economy - has continued to apply. This may not remain the 
case. Net financial transfers for the region have probably 
gone negative - certainly have on commercial bank account.
The 1985 economic outturn of the previously high growth/strong 
external balance group (South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan,
Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia) is much poorer, with 1986
prospects, except for Korea, also relatively poor. If - as in
Latin America over 1980-82 - this weakening of results and 
prospects leads to precipitate bank attempts to reduce
exposure there will (as a result of lemming like banker
behaviour) be an external debt crisis, notably in the case of 
South Korea.
Sub-Saharan Africa (Green and Griffith-Jones 1985; World Bank 
1984; Lancaster and Williamson 1986) is a special case as a 
region because concessional finance and international
financial institution credit - not commercial bank loans - are 
dominant for the region and for a majority of countries. 
Therefore, its net financial transfers have remained positive. 
By the same token it is in a weak bargaining position because 
continuation of net inflows is critical and in one debtor/all 
creditor negotiations African states are very much outgunned 
financially and in terms of expertise. However, the net 
financial transfer is falling very rapidly (has gone negative 
on private flows and is falling sharply on inter governmental 
and IMF account) and - including interest payments - may well 
be negative by 1986 unless a sharp reversal of the post 1980 
concessional finance decline trend takes place. IMF data 
indicate a net transfer of $6 ,900 mn in 1979 falling to $200 
mn in 1985 with a possible 1986 out-turn of -$1,200 mn.
Equally there has been some difference in treatment of debtors 
who are very large or have the 'protection' of a major power 
in their dealings with the Paris and/or London Clubs. In the 
first set of cases the debtor government has an analogue of 
'mutual assured destruction' to use in negotiation because its 
default would both directly and by chain reaction do totally 
unacceptable damage to the creditors. Individually, Mexico, 
Brazil and Argentina have this power. Collectively the 
Cartagena Group would hold it to an even greater degree if it 
were to agree to embark on collective or fully coordinated 
action. In the second set, the political or economic 
interests of a major OECD government have led to more 
optimistic and credit granting results than the inherent 
economic prospects or economic management of the country would 
otherwise have produced. The most evident cases are the 
Sudan, Zambia, Zaire, Jamaica and the Ivory Coast.10/
A third special category - cleary solvent but temporarily 
illiquid economies - is more problematic. The most evident 
case is - or at least was, until the 1986 oil price collapse -
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Venezuela and the only evident gain it secured was a
rescheduling (at rather more parsimonious interest rate and 
payment delay levels than normal) without a prior IMF 
agreement.
There have also been some divergencies in terms of specific
reschedulings. A few countries have rescheduled several
years' principal repayments at one go. Another handful have 
somewhat reduced the commercial bank interest rate spreads 
above LIBOR charged. The period over which rescheduled 
amounts are to be repaid has varied. Similarly the extent of 
'forced lending' to cover part of short term interest payments 
and the size of IMF credits and/or new World Bank and 
government concessional funding has varied. It is just 
possible to argue that a trend to longer periods, more 'new' 
money (i.e. loans partly off-setting interest) and greater 
attention to limiting net financial resource outflows exists. 
However, if so, that trend is very weak, sluggish and uneven.
The variations are not trivial from the perspective of
individual debtor countries. But at the global level they are 
distinctly marginal and - if seen as a trend to adjusting the 
rescheduling model to changing contexts - lag far behind the 
events to which they are responding both in speed and in 
degree.
Some Limitations Of The Model
The weaknesses - as well as the strengths - of the model flow 
from the fact that it is very creditor centred. The context 
of all creditors versus one debtor; the acceptance of the 
premise of full recovery of principal and interest (with at 
most marginal concessions on the latter) and therefore of 
defence of banks' profit flows as well as assets; and the
implicit premise that debtors should place debt servicing in 
the position of an overriding economic policy goal, whatever 
the cost, together combine to create a situation in which the 
details of time to pay and of interest and other charges - 
plus degree of rollover (so called new money or involuntary 
lending) - are about all there is to negotiate. The model
itself assumes the outcome on all the more basic parameters.
From this approach flows the fact that debt renegotiation does 
not focus on acceptable time periods and rates of recovery of 
the debtor economy. The reason creditors bridle at questions 
like President Nyerere's as to whether he and similarly placed 
heads of state should pay interest, not import grain and 
therefore let people starve is that the logic of the present 
model does indeed provide a clear answer - pay the interest
and the devil take the hindmost.
Unlike the enterprise reconstruction model, the sovereign debt 
model does not focus on the structural adjustment and 
rehabilitation of the sick economic unit, and it therefore
cannot ask questions about minimising total present losses and 
maximising potential future gains, nor can it go on to 
evaluate how these gains and losses can be divided. Had
Chrysler been treated on the sovereign debt renegotiation
model it would have been liquidated at the nadir of its
losses. Shareholders would have been wiped out (as would many
workers and communities), preferred creditors might have 
recovered half their exposure and ordinary creditors a 
quarter. In blunt terms the present sovereign debt
renegotiation model assumes a zero, not a positive, sum game 
and lays down rules of play which create the probability of 
the actual result being a negative sum game (Griffith-Jones 
1986; Zartman 1978).
The typical - and much criticised - features of the model are 
as follows:
a. short deferrals and relatively short periods to repay 
them;
b. no re-scheduling of amounts renegotiated once;
c. no significant cuts in interest rates or fees;
d. no ceilings on maximimum financial resource outflow or 
maximum period before net positive inflows are to be 
restored;
e. absence of safeguard clauses against other capital 
movement leakages (e.g. running down revolving trade 
credits, short term deposits) wiping out the supposed 
gain;
f. lack of provisions for renegotiation (or formula 
adjustment of payments - i.e. a bisque clause - if 
external contexts and events are not as the negotiators
assumed)
These are not separate, secondary elements. They are integral 
to the overall approach and within that approach can be toned 
down but neither phased out nor transformed into a positive
sum game set guideline.
And Its Worldview
The all creditors/one debtor/all to be repaid approach leads 
to standard prescriptions well beyond the immediate debt 
deferral, repayment, interest rates and charges ones. The 
most important is the ubiquitious precondition of an IMF 
higher credit tranche agreement.
The immediate reasons for this precondition are more complex 
than any demonolog ical view.. Bankers may see the IMF as 
primarily a debt collection enforcement agency. It is
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doubtful that they really do understand and believe in the 
IMF's pure macro-monetary adjustment model (Williamson 1983; 
Green 1986). Rather, bankers have found that macroeconomic 
policy by a debtor can make performance of its rescheduling 
agreement impossible and that banker ability to negotiate and 
enforce a broad macroeconomic policy package (tried relatively 
unsuccessfully with Cuba and radically so with Peru) with 
sovereign risk debtors is very low. Further, over 1960-80 
most reschedulings did relate to mismanaged economies or ones 
suffering from atypical economic shocks. The IMF was - and is 
- a body created to help buffer adjustment to or stabilisation 
across shocks and to offer macro monetary (external and 
internal balance) advice. It is in this context that it makes 
credits (drawings) available to its members on negotiated 
terms and conditions. Since this conditionality is intended 
to be adequate to secure a return to economic balance and 
(less clearly) growth, it is not unreasonable for debtors to 
assume it would also be relevant to restoring ability to 
service debt.
The difficulty with this approach is that the IMF operates on 
a rigid model which abstracts both from specific contexts and 
from the real (physical) aspects of the economic process. As 
a result, it seeks to impose uniform policy packages which 
often do not fit and which are very short term and monetary 
balance focused. Whether they are in general - let alone in 
all cases - consistent with achieving structural adjustment 
and future growth is, at the least, highly problematic (Green
1986) .
Worse, the IMF model of stabilisation is based on domestic 
demand and import compression and export (and debt servicell/) 
expansion. Like the sovereign external debt renegotiation 
model, the IMF model tacitly assumes that countries with 
severe imbalances are in a minority and that their imbalances 
result largely from clearly identifiable and both readily and 
speedily reversible macroeconomic policy errors. Whatever the 
validity of this view over 1960-80 it can hardly be accepted 
as a valid description of the 1980-86 situation.
Imbalances have been the rule, not the exception. Therefore 
to urge domestic demand and import compression plus export 
expansion as a recipe in each case adds up to a global 
macroeconomic impossibility on the trade side. One country's 
imports are another's exports. One cannot in general cut the 
former and raise the latter, even though any one economy may 
be able to do so. On the demand side it is a mechanism for 
deflation in the midst of a depression (perverse 
countercyclical policy). Thus - in a global depression or 
slow growth context generally and for some economies even in 
other contexts - the IMF model is as poorly oriented to 
creating a positive sum game context as is the present debt 
renegotiation one.
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Blind Spots And Conditions for Sustainability
Clearly therefore, neither the sovereign debt renegotiation 
nor the IMF model really addresses itself to the conditions 
conducive to stable external debt managing and servicing:
a. moderate to rapid output growth globally and in specific 
debtor countries;
b. facilitating rapid expansion of global trade with
c. an adjustment of production in creditor countries 
allowing space for more imports from debtors;
d. creating room for debtors to service external debt out of 
export earnings without savage reductions in imports, and
e. also recreating a context of confidence in normal 
servicing of debt with individual loans repaid when due 
that will result in a reversal of the present net 
transfer of financial resources from Third World 
debtors.12/
Indeed, as they now operate the models make attainment of each 
of these conditions harder, not easier.
This is particularly serious - not least from the creditors' 
point of view - because the basic conditions for survival of 
the present sovereign external debt and rescheduling structure 
include stable four to five per cent a year growth of OECD 
economies and five to six per cent a year growth of world 
trade (including debtor exports to creditors).13/ These 
conditions have not both been met in any year since 1979 and 
no serious economic forecast shows them as likely to be met 
over 1987-90.
As a result the 1980-86 rescheduling process has been kept 
going only by hectic juggling and patchwork on major cases and 
a growing number of fudges or blind eye turning to what amount 
to defaults.
Bolivia for example has long said - correctly - that it cannot 
pay or reschedule on available terms. This has been ignored. 
So was Peru's effective limitation of interest and repayment 
on medium and long term official external debt to ten per cent 
of export earnings until President Garcia enunciated it as a 
principle. Many smaller, weaker African debtors have huge 
trade credit and more conventional debt service arrears - in 
several individual cases exceeding $500 mn. Even arrears of 
over $200 mn each to the IMF by the Sudan and Zambia were for 
extended periods quietly kept out of the headlines, while 
attempts to reconcile the principle of the sanctity of debts 
(especially to the IMF), the reality of no foreign exchange to 
pay and the need to avoid a precedent setting/system shaking 
default or forgiveness of debt were juggled ever more
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frenetically backstage. Failed IMF, Paris and London Club 
programmes - e.g. Sudan, Zaire - have regularly been given new 
coats of paint (or more literally, new, hopelessly unrealistic 
economic policy and outcome projections) and presented as new 
ways forward (or even part of an ongoing, partly successful 
process!) to avoid a precedent setting collapse.
The handwriting is on the wall. The 1980-86 model is working 
increasingly fitfully, unevenly and partially even in respect 
to the only area in respect to which it has been successful - 
avoiding major shocks and threats to the stability of the 
international financial system. On existing economic
projections it can be expected to encounter more problems, not 
less, over 1987-90. Meanwhile, the debtors counting the 
domestic costs of enforced domestic depression and the ever 
retreating vision of restoration of net financial inflows are 
ever less willing to continue paying the bulk of the global 
price of holding together an international financial system 
they never made and which never operated primarily for their 
benef i t .
These comments on weaknesses of the model are not directed to 
dividing up blame for the debt crises. The criticism of banks 
that they encouraged governments to take up loans at then 
negative real interest rates for poorly defined purposes (in 
one case raising real public service wages while the real 
price of the economy's basic export and production sector fell 
with no foreseeable recovery) is true enough. So is the 
counter argument that the governments should have had more 
sense. The criticism that the same banks that lent the 
sovereign debt were in many cases the channels by which 
private individuals expatriated comparable sums which give 
nominal (and only nominal, not operational) balance between 
public external debt and private external assets is valid. So 
is the counterpoint that many of these flows (e.g. in the case 
of Mexico) were legal and the others (e.g. in the case of the 
Argentine) required debtor state complicity as well as bank 
facilitation. Clearly balances of fault do have a certain 
impact at or even beyond the margin on negotiations. This is 
especially likely to be the case where a new, popular 
government can say the debt incurred by an overthrown military 
or other dictatorial predecessor gave no or little value to 
the borrower; that payment would - on present or comparable 
terms - exact unbearable domestic costs; and, therefore, that 
the government is politically unable as well as unwilling to 
pay - at least as scheduled. But such factors are usually 
secondary and very country specific. Further, the two evident 
debtor governments able to deploy them - President Alfonsin's 
in Argentina and President Aquino's in the Philippines - have 
been surprisingly reticent about doing so.
The more general case is that:
1. an external sovereign debt crisis exists which if not 
resolved will do very grave damage to creditors, debtors,
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the national economies of both and the international 
economy;
2. in part this relates to neither borrowers nor creditors 
having envisaged the actual 1980-85 global economic
scenario correctly (a 'fault' they share with each other,
industrial economy governments, OECD, IMF, etc.);
3. and in part to imprudence (and in some cases malpractice) 
both by lenders (banks and governments) and by borrowers;
4. therefore the overriding common interest is in minimising 
the sum of present losses and maximising the pace and 
level of future gains/recoveries;
5. with the secondary requirement of achieving an acceptable 
division of those gains and losses among the parties
involved.
An inquisitorial or adversorial proceeding of a quasi criminal
type is not very likely to be a large part of the solution to
these problems.
Nor do the foregoing comments on weaknesses imply that bankers 
are unaware of basic as well as surface defects in the present 
model, even from their own perspective.
For example, in late 1984 a vice-president of a major
international bank outlined his nightmare to the present
author. It was that in negotiations the banks would 
successfully press a Brazilian delegation so hard as to secure 
a package so 'good' for the banks and so damaging to the 
Brazilian economy that it would result in the tiling ol m e  
Brazilian negotiators and a radical swing to a Brazilian
initiative take it or leave j.t strategy. He wanted the 
academic community to warn when that danger point was 
approaching. The answer he got, that in the case of Brazil 
the banks were already beyond it and needed to pull back fast, 
did not console him. But, one may suspect, the fact that 
within six months a 'successful'1 Brazilian negotiating mission 
to the IMF and the banks was fired on- arrival home and the new 
Brazilian government steadily redesigned and hardened its 
model for debt renegotiation did not very greatly surprise 
him, and may have saved his and other banks a good deal of 
grief and money.
The current case - as of late 1986 - of a danger of banks 
insisting on 'doing too well* and precipitating a crisis is 
Mexico. Unless and until there is a sustained petroleum price 
recovery to well over $20 a barrel, Mexico cannot possibly 
meet the bulk of its interest payments and reverse the post 
1982 decline in GDP per capita. With the strains on and 
cracks in its social and political fabric already plain to 
see, enforced continuation of contraction is likely to have 
very severe costs, not only for Mexicans but for creditors and
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neighbouring states.
Toward Debtor Initiatives
Over 1983-86 debtors have had a rising consciousness of the 
costs of standard model debt renegotiations tied to standard 
IMF adjustment programmes. In addition they have seen ever 
more clearly that no early return either to positive net 
resource transfers or to easy export growth was foreseeable. 
As a result they have become less and less willing to bear the 
bulk of the burden of holding up the international financial 
system and the profits of the major banks. Indeed, some have 
come to see 1980-85 model rescheduling as being a holdup in 
the sense of an armed robbery, not merely that of Atlas 
holding up the world on his shoulders.
This has led to a growing number of what amount to unilateral 
initiatives and/or proposals for renegotiation within 
parameters set by the debtors. With the possible exception of 
Peru's trumpeting of a ten per cent of exports debt service 
ceiling, all appear to have been phrased with a view to 
shocking creditors and hurrying them into negotiations before 
still more unpalatable take it or leave it offers were made, 
but also phrased in a low enough key to avert a wholesale, 
instant financial panic.
Two of the initiatives are regional. The Latin American one 
has a pre or parallel history in SELA (ECLA) technical papers 
and discussions but, in fact, no really innovative official 
proposals have emanated from that source as yet. The Cartagena 
Group (the major debtors) has to date played a background role 
using its existence as a periodic forum to pose the threat of 
a 'debtors' cartel' without actually becoming one and issuing 
statements implicitly threatening collective action when a 
major member was in particular difficulties with its 
renegotiation. However, in 1985 and again in 1986 it 
apparently began to move toward a more substantive role 
issuing statements on the need for reduced net outflows and 
increased access for exports while in 1986 giving a tepid 
welcome to the Baker Plan as in the right direction but too 
cautious and too small. However, the Cartagena Group today 
has not followed up collective statements with coordinated 
action to support its most exposed members - Argentina in 
1985 , Brazil in 1986 . Until it does so the value of 
successive forceful statements wil gradually erode.
The African position - taken at the 1985 OAU Economic Summit 
largely on the initiative of its outgoing Chairman, Julius 
Nyerere - is somewhat clearer and attempts to be more active 
than that of the Cartagena Group. It calls for a conference 
of all African debtor states with all major creditor states to 
discuss basic parameters for substantial reductions ir. debt 
service payments (implicitly for an extended period) and for 
substantial increases in the net financial resource transfers
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to Africa.
This position relates to certain special features of the 
African case. Governments, not banks, are the major creditors 
(and together with international institutions the only likely 
sources of net inflows); aid is substantial absolutely and 
relative to debt service; while rapidly declining, the net 
financial flow balance is still positive. As President 
Nyerere put it at Mansion House, London, in April 1985, Africa 
is too poor to refuse to pay (and lose all credit and aid) but 
equally too poor to pay on present terms and conditions (which 
would soon lead to a net outflow).
The African proposals to the UN Special Session in May 1986 , 
called for over $35,000 mn of reduced debt service payments 
over 1986-90 and for agreement on a general framework on debt 
rescheduling. The final resolution ignores the quantitative 
aspect and calls only for flexibility within a framework of 
case by case rescheduling. However, the Chairman of the 
Non-Aligned Movement, Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, re-raised the 
issue most forcefully at the September 1986 NAM Conference in 
Harare and the Organisation of African Unity is still seeking 
to achieve a creditor-debtor conference for Africa.
National Gambits -
Over the past two years a number of debtor countries have 
acted openly and formally to reduce their debt service burdens 
in ways very different from the standard rescheduling model. 
All have stopped well short of repudiating their external 
sovereign debt or even stating that it was, and would remain
in, default. Almost all have sought renegotiation - but on
their own terms. Each national gambit differs in certain 
respects from the others - sometimes, but not always, for
reasons which clearly relate to contextual or country 
specificities of the debtor.
Bolivia was the first country to declare openly and formally 
that it could not pay principal or even all interest due. By 
itself this created little stir. Bolivia clearly could not 
pay, had limited bank borrowings and if ignored would - the 
creditors hoped - not set a precedent.
Peru, however, has alarmed creditors much more. In late 1984 
the Central Bank (at that point in opposition to stated
government policy) began limiting debt service payments to 
what it believed could be afforded after meeting minimum
import needs, i.e., treating them as a residual (or deferred
creditor) not a top priority (or first charge) item. This
aroused little open bank reaction until - following elections 
- President Alan Garcia formalised and publicised this policy, 
setting an external debt service ceiling for medium and long 
term of ten per cent of export earnings and, at least
implicitly, raising this as a standard for other sovereign
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debtors to rally around.
The announcement that the international development 
organisations (IADB, World Bank, but not the IMF) were to be 
paid on schedule meant not only that Peru would be able to pay 
little interest (let alone amortisation) on commercial bank 
(or bilateral government) loans but that it was asserting the 
right to treat creditors unequally (a cardinal sin under Paris 
and London Club rules). This was aggravated by the fact that 
Peru has both kept revolving trade credits with a selected 
group of banks current and is using that device to limit the 
problems with financing trade flows which, assertedly, would 
follow from even a partial unilateral moratorium, while also 
building up its useable external reserves to over $1,500 mn.
The first African case which marked a clearcut unilateral 
initiative was - ironically - the Republic of South Africa in 
mid-1985. The combination of poor economic prospects and the 
hassle (and business loss) factor of dealing with the 
apartheid economy led US banks to seek to pull out by 
non-renewal of all maturing loans.14/ While RSA has a current 
account surplus it also has a short external debt time profile 
and could not repay if the flow of new credits stopped. It 
therefore declared a moratorium or 'automatic rollover' on all 
external loans (except, one assumes, the IMF) and has 
negotiated on the basis of no or virtually no net capital 
repayment.
Nigeria's initial (1984) rescheduling efforts were unusual 
only in that the government declined to enter into an IMF 
agreement. Beyond that the Nigerian proposals were quite 
within the model - over 40 per cent debt service was 
apparently seen as acceptable. In 1986, however, Nigeria 
announced a unilateral 30 per cent of exports ceiling 
(adequate to cover all interest and perhaps half of capital 
account repayments) and called on creditors to negotiate 
individually or collectively within that parameter.
However, the greatest tremors to date probably flow from 
Brazil's 1986 actions. First, it insisted on a two year 
rollforward of revolving trade credits and short term deposits 
totalling $16 bn without an IMF agreement - implicitly 
threatening a moratorium in all other debt if the $16 bn was, 
to any substantial extent, withdrawn. Second, it declined to 
reimburse the external creditors of two failed private sector 
banks in full or on terms markedly preferential to domestic 
creditors (external creditors received about 67 per cent and 
domestic about 50 per cent) . As Brazil has a large current 
account surplus before interest as well as $100,000 mn odd of 
external debt, it has had unusually strong leverage and has 
secured grudging de facto acceptance both of the rollforward 
and of the partial payment.
The Mexican rescheduling package begun with the third quarter 
1986 Agreement may also become precedent setting, but is still
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ambiguous in its outcome and implications. The IMF agreement 
does have a de facto bisque (or exogenous contingency) clause. 
If the export price of crude oil fluctuates below (above) a 
set range, the drawings and the government borrowing limit 
will automatically be increased (decreased). The value of 
this apparently precedent-making provision to Mexico may be 
limited as the price below which it would receive additional 
drawings is significantly below the September 1986 level which 
is itself disastrous for Mexico.
On the commercial bank side, Mexico is demanding substantially 
lower interest rates (significantly below the US prime rate) 
not re-lending or rolling forward interest. But its 
statements appear - not only to commercial bank ears - to fall 
short of saying it will enforce such cuts unilaterally if 
creditors refuse to negotiate them. In the meantime there 
appear to have been substantial slippages in levels of short 
term deposits with and revolving trade credits with Mexican 
banks.
- and Creditor Pre-emption Attempts
Creditors - or at least some creditors - have also begun to 
have second thoughts about the continued viability of the 
1980-85 debt rescheduling model. The reasons appear to be 
four fold:
1. its import reducing impact on debtors is bad for global 
and OECD economy export and GDP growth;
2. its export forcing impact creates severe protectionist
lobby problems in OECD economies plagued by the highest 
relative unemployment rates since the 1930s;
3. the constant juggling needed to keep it in place is 
nerve-racking and resource demanding as well as 
suggesting that at some point a major default will not be 
barely averted but will actually happen;
4. increasing debtor self assertion implies that the risks 
of a head-on confrontation are rising unless changes are 
made reducing their net financial transfer outflows and 
increasing their short and medium term growth prospects.
The major pre-emptive initiative for combining standard
rescheduling with growth has been the Baker Plan launched by 
the US Secretary of the Treasury at the 1985 Fund/Bank Annual 
Meetings. Its main features are: $20 bn in additional new
commercial bank loans to key developing countries following 
'responsible' policies, complemented by a similar amount of 
additional World Bank lending (presumably largely to the same 
countries), plus recycling of the IMF Trust Fund to reduce net 
repayments to the IMF by low income countries pursuing IMF 
programmes but facing longer external balance adjustment
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periods than IMF drawings are designed for.
Secretary Baker's proposals were a serious attempt to marry 
conventional debt rescheduling and IMF stabilisation to 
revived growth by at least many developing economies and 
thereby to bolster the growth of world trade. They would, of 
course, help raise US exports (and reduce protectionist 
pressures) and safeguard US bank loans, but they do have a
broader set of goals as well.
However, they are problematic at three levels. The sums are 
too small to achieve the stated purposes for more than a 
handful of countries. Indeed, arguably, the global total 
would be inadequate to cover 1986-90 requirements for Mexico 
alone. Further - except for the Trust Fund recycling - they
virtually exclude low income countries (unless and until the 
USA backs, and delivers its pledges to, a sharply expanded 
IDA). Third, the proposals had a heavy dose of cross 
conditionality including both IMF vetting for fiscal orthodoxy 
and US testing for adequate concentration on promoting the 
private sector, including its foreign members. Secretary 
Baker was clearly seeking (and to date failing) to achieve a 
conservative, pre-emptive strike to head off any basic changes 
in the renegotiation model by lessening (but by no means 
eliminating) the net burdens it imposes on debtors.
IMF Managing Director, Jacques Delarosiere, has firmly
adumbrated a similar approach:
While it was inevitable, and indeed essential, for the 
banks to scale back their lending from the unsustainable 
levels recorded up to 1981, the recent trend has been 
toward a too rapid disengagement - one that if not
reversed could undermine the efforts of countries making 
progress toward adjustment. (Delarosiere 1986)
Toward Positive Sum Game Renegotiation?
Fairly clearly, changes from the 1980-85 debt renegotiation 
model could be desirable for all - or almost all - parties and 
are also inevitable. While only partly responsive to debtor 
needs and largely in the context of the old model, the Baker 
proposals did and do represent some flexibility and a 
realisation that the present approach to debt renegotiation 
has high present and higher potential costs to the global and 
creditor economies.
A positive sum game model can be worked out - e.g. by analogy 
to the enterprise restructuring model sketched above. 
However, by definition it cannot be achieved without at least 
a substantial degree of cooperation among creditor and debtor 
governments plus, preferably at least, the tacit consent of 
the IMF and the commercial banks. For debtors to attempt to 
impose unilateral solutions (or creditors to face debtor
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initiatives with the Baker Plan and no more - or a watered 
down Baker plus economic assaults against obstreperous, medium 
sized debtors like Peru) would lead to confrontation 
exceedingly likely to result in an international financial and 
trade system crisis amounting to partial collapse. That would 
be a very negative sum game indeed.
The first logical debtor proposal would be to reverse the 
present 'case by case' negotiations by all creditors with each 
debtor separately to enforce a basically uniform creditor 
built rescheduling model:
1. basic guidelines should be negotiated among all major 
debtor and creditor governments (or alternatively with 
separate Latin American, African and - potentially - 
Asian debtor groups) with IMF, World Bank and Commercial 
Bank representation;15/
2. on the basis of these guidelines, country settlements 
should take into account the special conditions applying 
to that particular debtor country.
A second step would be to treat global output and trade growth 
as just as important goals for the macro debt renegotiation 
process as avoiding major shocks to the international 
financial institutions. The corollary is that any national 
rescheduling should be within the parameters of making 
possible return to positive real per capita growth of GDP and 
of earned import capacity (i.e. purchasing power of exports) 
within three years.
Third, some form of ceiling on net financial outflows 
{including interest) or floor on net financial inflows 
presumably relative to exports and possibly GDP - should be 
set. The simple form of X per cent of export earnings for 
gross debt service is not, in fact, satisfactory except in the 
extreme case of no new loans. A more general version would 
apply to net debt service (interest plus repayments less new 
loans and grants). A more ambitious formula would be 
immediate or binding (as opposed to hortatory or 
cosmetic)target date achievement of nil outward transfer (i.e. 
interest offset by new loans and grants). A still more 
ambitious step would be to set minimum positive inward 
transfer.
A uniform formula is not practicable. Sub-Saharan Africa as a 
whole and virtually all of its economies need positive inflow 
targets if GDP growth at least equal to that of population is 
to be achieved. Some - though not all - Latin American 
economies seem prepared to accept a maximum net outflow 
target, at least for several years. This may suggest a case 
for separate African and Latin American negotiations (albeit 
Bolivia, Paraguay and some Central American and Caribbean 
economies also appear to need net inflow floors, not outflow 
ceilings). If that is the case general criteria are needed to
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define the characteristics which lead to net inflows, net 
balance or constrained net outflow targets.
How to achieve these targets is perhaps a less crucial and 
certainly a consequential issue. Interest rate reduction; 
enhanced new loan and grant levels; quasi automatic rollovers 
and multi-year deferrals of debt service with long subsequent 
payback periods could all play useful roles in at least some
cases. An ample literature has explored them - singly and
collectively - in great detail but, to date, remains
peripheral to the actual negotiating process.
A more critical demand would be for guidelines for automatic 
rollforward of payments due if mutually unanticipated events 
(including global economic trends and natural disasters) make
initially agreed target levels inconsistent with growth
floors. Recent Mexican and Venezuelan agreements and
proposals go some way toward this goal, but only for heavily 
indebted petroleum exporters dependent on oil price
stability/recovery.
Finally, in the cases of extremely indebted poor and middle 
income countries the present discounted value of future debt 
service needs to be reduced. This need not necessarily imply 
writeoffs of principal. Extended repayment periods at lower 
interest rates could have the same effect and might create
less immediate problems for bank balance sheets even though 
they would reduce future bank profit flows.
A rational creditor response pattern - i.e. one aimed at 
achieving an agreed, positive sum game outcome might include 
acceptance in principle of multilateral guideline setting but 
proposing a less than optimal forum, e.g. the Fund-Bank 
Interim Committee, and exclude binding acceptance of the 
guidelines by the London and Paris Clubs. The venue problem 
is real - UNCTAD is clearly unacceptable to the creditors and 
a Fund-Bank Committee is not a truly neutral venue from a 
debtor perspective. Conceivably an ad hoc G77-G10 committee 
with a joint secretariat might be viable. The experiment with 
Committees of 'Wise Men' is not very conducive to faith in 
this method, unless the members were serving senior Ministers 
of Finance, Central Bank Governors and Commercial Bank 
Presidents. While there is no evident way to make the 
guidelines equally binding, they certainly should be accepted 
as binding government delegates to the Paris Club, and maximum 
arm-twisting used on the banks who comprise the London Club.
In principle the creditors should have no objection to 
building global and national GDP and trade growth targets into 
rescheduling. The counterproposals would seem likely to turn 
on target rates, on what was to happen were these not achieved 
and on whether they should be formally included in the 
rescheduling agreement documents.
Maximum gross debt service ratios will certainly be
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challenged. Net ones on a country by country basis might be 
seen as acceptable. For example, the final resolution 
unanimously adopted by the UN General Assembly Special Session 
on Sub-Saharan Africa did accept that no creditor government 
should have a net return flow of interest and principal over 
new loans and grants to any SSA economy in serious financial 
trouble. Any general breakeven or positive flow target will 
be strongly resisted, possibly with the exception of least
developed or low income debtors. Further, at this point - if
not before - issues of policy conditionality will be raised. 
This is logical if they relate to trade balance evolution, 
less evidently so if they lay down uniform criteria for 
domestic macroeconomic policy.
On how to achieve targets, creditors would probably have the 
least objections to multi year deferral and extended repayment 
plus more new loans in general, and to more concessional 
finance for least developed or low income countries.
Reduction of interest rates will be opposed with the
conceivable exception of interest on rescheduled debt.16/
Automatic adjustment guidelines/formulas to relate payments to 
global or other external economic devlopments will be 
resisted. Commitments to renegotiate in good faith 
especially in respect to sudden interest rate surges or key 
export price falls - may be proposed as an alternative with 
the not unreasonable proposition that if results are much 
better than anticipated, then advance repayments on a portion 
of rescheduled debt should be envisaged.
Writeoffs are likely to be opposed - the only recent precedent 
is the 1960s Indonesian rescheduling. However, in respect to 
low and low^r middle income economies * including a 
significant number in Africa - which clearly cannot pay the 
present discounted value of their debt on any rational 
projections, a combination of increased concessional finance 
and de facto substitution of low interest government to 
government loans for a portion of maturing (or de facto 
defaulted) non-concessional loans might be acceptable. Both 
John Williamson reviewing the Institute for International 
Economics' 1986 'African Debt and Finance' Conference and the 
World Bank reviewing how adjustment with growth might be 
achieved in SSA came to the conclusion that at least for a 
dozen countries external debt was unmanageable (Lancaster and 
Williamson 1986; World Bank 1986b). The Bank, in fact, fairly 
clearly argues that once these countries enter into serious 
structural adjustment efforts, they should be supported by 
very substantial de jure or de facto external debt writedowns.
Much more marginally - but also more generally - some 
reduction in present discounted value of debt service via 
lower interest rates on rescheduled/rolled over debt might 
also be acceptable. In this context a counterproposal is 
likely that if results within a given period are above mutally 
agreed projections then a portion of that gain would go to
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creditors who have accepted interest rate or principal sum 
reductions. This would be an analogue to the equity for loan 
tradeoff aspect of the enterprise model.17/
Such a set of counterproposals is the most which can plausibly 
be expected from creditors, and that only after preliminary 
attempts to respond with a much more restrictive set. They do 
have a substantial margin of divergence from the logical 
debtor demands. However, that margin would appear to be a 
negotiable one and one which sets negotiating parameters 
within the range likely to produce positive sum game outcomes.
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Notes
1. Professor Green is a Fellow of the Institute of 
Development Studies at the University of Sussex. He 
has written extensively on adjustment and on 
sub-Saharan Africa's external debt and is currently 
collaborating in a debt renegotiation research project 
led by Dr. Stephany G r iffith-Jones for whose comments 
on an earlier draft of the present paper he is 
grateful.
2. The sections of the present paper reviewing the 1980-85 
renegotiation model draw substantially on this paper 
and on discussions with its author.
3. There is a debate on when and whether net inflows -
which are normal historically tor a developing economy 
or a growing company - are likely to resume. See,
e.g., Cline 1984.
4. For banks as a group the 'new' loans were a low price 
for averting default. As they represented only part of 
interest, the net cash flow was to the banks.
5. Whether this is a new feature is not clear. In the
1960s and 1970s reschedulings, very few non-guaranteed 
private sector borrower loans were outstanding. An odd 
echo of this point arises in the case of the insolvent
International Tin Council. The Council is an
independent, intergovernmental legal entity. Its 
liabilities - from failed tin market management - 
exceed its assets. Bank creditors demand its members 
meet tne déficit. ias ao metal brokers wtio face real 
bankruptcy risks otherwise) which it is by no means 
clear they are legally obligated to do. Oddly enough 
the developing country members were at one point 
willing to pay, but Germany, Japan and France led
opposition to a bail-out operation.
6. Presumably gunboat debt collection, literally putting
in a Treasury/Central Bank receiver and manager at
gunpoint, is no longer practicable.
7. Seizing external assets of debtor states - and
especially exports and imports - is usually laborious, 
uncertain and quite inadequate in proceeds to service 
debt.
8. A former TNC senior manager who had apparently
specialised in turning around ailing overseas 
subsidiaries, remarked as a new ambassador that he 
could not understand creditor/IMF logic in a specific 
case. They appeared to want de facto to liquidate the 
economy - which as a company doctor he had always 
viewed as a last, not a first resort. And, in any
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event, liquidating a national economy for the benefit 
of creditors was not possible.
10.
11.
1 2 .
13.
14 .
15.
16. 
17.
9. On fiscal policy the USA is an evident exception; on 
monetary policy (partly consequentially) it is very 
restrictive indeed.
In all but the Ivory Coast these comments apply 
particularly forcibly to the IMF. The USA has been the 
presumptive 'protecting' power in all but the Ivoirian
case.
In all fairness the IMF sees itself much more as a 
systemic platonic guardian than as a debt collection 
agent for commercial banks and, indeed, rather resents 
being given the latter role.
See, e.g. Cline 1984. His cutoff rates are 3.5 per 
cent for OECD and about 5 per cent for world trade 
growth.
This represents a broad summary of the conclusions of 
analysts such as Cline (0£ cit) who are optimistic 
about the survival of the structure.
The attempted withdrawal of credit was to public and
private enterprises as well as to the government.
Clearly not all actors can participate directly in 
actual negotiating sessions, as mob scenes, not 
negotiations would ensue. Representatives would need 
to be selected, e.g. the G24 for the debtors.
Banks do not have to lend at LIBOR to break even.
Their average cost of funds is much lower. On a
scheduled loan which would otherwise be defaulted it is
hard to see a case for an interest rate higher than the 
average cost of funds to the lender.
Actual transactions involving conversion of external 
public debt into foreign private equity investment are 
taking place - especially in Chile and Mexico. (See,
e.g. International Herald Tribune, 12-IX-86, 'Latin 
Countries Turning to Debt-for-Equity Swaps.') However, 
even though such exchanges may have reached $1,000 mn 
by late 1986 and on some estimates have a potential of 
$10,000 mn this is very marginal in comparison to about 
$1,000,000 mn Third World external sovereign debt.
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